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LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND PATIENT SAFETY
Kathryn Zeiler* and Gregory Hardy**
INTRODUCTION
The Institute of Medicine’s frequently cited report, To Err is
Human, brought to light the high rate of patient injuries from medical
errors in hospitals throughout the United States.1 The report esti-
mated that the number of deaths resulting from medical error in 1997
was as high as 98,000.2 Despite efforts over the nearly two decades
since the report was published, the medical error rate remains a per-
vasive problem. In 2016, Makary and Daniel ranked medical error as
the third leading cause of death in the United States, estimating that
approximately 250,000 deaths from medical error occur annually.3 The
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) estimated that 27% of Medicare benefi-
ciaries experienced adverse events during hospital stays in 2008.4
Other studies have demonstrated similar adverse event rates in non-
Medicare populations.5
Various regulatory agencies require reporting of adverse events.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), for example,
* Nancy Barton Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. kzeiler@bu
.edu. We thank the participants of the DePaul University College of Law 2018 Clifford Sympo-
sium on Tort Law and Social Policy for useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to
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** Boston University School of Law, Class of 2019.
1. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et
al. eds., 2000). The report defined “adverse events” as “medical errors resulting in injury.” Id. at
1–2.
2. Id.
3. Martin A. Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical Error—A Leading (but Hidden) Cause of
Death, 353 BRIT. MED. J. 236, 237 (2016).
4. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-09-00090,
ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
15–20 (2010) [hereinafter ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS]. Approximately 268,000 benefi-
ciaries experienced an adverse event, 13.5% experienced lasting harm, and 13.5% experienced
temporary harm. “Adverse event” is defined as “harm to a patient as a result of medical care
. . . .” Id. at i.
5. See David C. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows that Adverse Events in Hospitals
May Be Ten Times Greater than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581, 581 (2011) [herein-
after Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’] (reporting that “adverse events occurred in one-third
of hospital admissions”).
459
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requires participating hospitals to “measure, analyze, and track qual-
ity indicators, including adverse patient events, and other aspects of
performance that assess processes of care, hospital service and opera-
tions.”6 About half the states run systems to collect adverse event re-
ports from hospitals.7
Adverse event counts using data from such collection and reporting
systems are wildly inaccurate. While tracking and reporting is re-
quired, compliance relies mostly on providers’ voluntary reports. In
addition, sanctions for failing to report adverse events seem to be
quite weak.8
In 2005, in an effort to reduce adverse event rates, Congress pro-
posed a list of “never events”—adverse events, such as wrong-site sur-
gery, that should never occur in hospitals—and authorized CMS to
refuse payment for care required following such events. CMS has
since pushed for further regulation, “such as putting more payment at
risk, increasing transparency, increasing frequency of quality data re-
views, and stepping up media scrutiny.”9 Evidence suggests these pub-
lic reporting and pay-for-performance initiatives compel hospitals to
manipulate reports, and in some cases patient treatment, to conceal
adverse events.10
The purpose of this Article is to consider how we might use law
coupled with technological advances to increase adverse event count
accuracy. On the technology front, three advances are particularly rel-
evant. First, digitization of medical records, billing data, and other
sources of germane information has made collecting large amounts of
data easier than ever. Second, current adverse event counters employ
powerful computer algorithms, and we are likely moving towards de-
tecting adverse events through analysis of large datasets using artifi-
cial intelligence. Third, governmental entities have started to team up
with computer scientists who use cryptographic techniques to collect
sensitive data in ways that protect the anonymity of data producers.11
We explore how law might harness the power of these technological
developments to increase adverse event count accuracy without creat-
6. 42 C.F.R. § 482.21(a)(2) (2018).
7. Kaitlin Sheedy et al., 2014 Guide to State Adverse Event Reporting Systems, NAT’L ACAD.
FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 1, 2015), https://nashp.org/2014-guide-state-adverse-event-report
ing-systems/.
8. See Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection, Disclosure,
and Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 452–53 (2012) [hereinafter Furrow, Adverse
Events and Patient Injury].
9. Id. at 447–49.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
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ing incentives for providers to hide data or alter treatment practices in
harmful or wasteful ways.
Efficiently decreasing adverse event rates is impossible without ac-
curate adverse event counts. Without accurate counts, estimating the
costs and benefits of methods that might help lower adverse event
rates is difficult.12 In addition, lack of access to accurate counts makes
judging the efficacy of efforts to improve patient safety impossible.13
We are not the first to consider legal reforms related to adverse
event counts. Since the Institute of Medicine’s 2000 report, experts
have considered how the law might improve counts. Barry Furrow, for
example, has repeatedly suggested that the government mandate hos-
pitals to report adverse events and patient outcomes.14 Furrow has
also argued that payer reimbursements should account for safety per-
formance.15 Most recently, Furrow proposed a new federal agency to
regulate patient safety.16 Furrow’s Patient Safety Commission would
mandate safety-data collection, computerized detection tool use, pub-
lic adverse event disclosure, and compensation for injured patients.
Maxine Harrington, on the other hand, has warned that, given data
unreliability, patient safety efforts should not focus on adverse event
counting.17 Rather, she suggests shifting our efforts towards mandat-
ing practices that have been shown to benefit patient safety, such as
monitoring hand washing to decrease the incidence of hospital-based
infections. We build on this literature by considering how the law
might take advantage of recent technological advances to both im-
prove data reliability and increase patient safety.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I describes current meth-
ods used by hospitals, CMS, and researchers to count adverse events.
It also attempts to explain the wide disparities in counts produced by
12. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 447 (“Systematic data
collection will spur improved safety practices . . . . Improved methods of adverse event detection
also allow the evaluation of various patient-safety initiatives, reducing their evaluation cost and
helping to develop a reliable arsenal of safety tools.”).
13. Id.
14. Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 181, 216–17 (2003).
15. Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: Toward a Federal Model of Medical Error
Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2005). But see Amy Chaho, To Pay or Not to Pay:
Medicare and the Preventable Adverse Event: A Rational Decision or Dangerous Philosophical
Change?, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 91, 134–36 (2009) (disagreeing with Furrow’s focus on reimburse-
ment and asserting that cooperation, not coercion through non-payment, is the best means of
improving patient safety).
16. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 447–49.
17. Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have
Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAW-MEDICINE 329,
331–32 (2005).
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various counting methods. A close look at count disparities illumi-
nates two problems with today’s methods. First, the most reliable
count estimates are not generalizable. Second, evidence suggests that
providers act to shroud true counts, sometimes in ways that put pa-
tients at risk. Part II suggests that recent technological advances might
make it possible to use law to improve the accuracy of adverse event
counts. In particular, we explore the law’s possible annexing of three
technological advances—digitized patient data, artificial intelligence,
and cryptography—to assemble a state-of-the-art adverse events
dataset that could make it possible for policymakers, in conjunction
with providers, to take well-informed steps towards increasing patient
safety. Part III discusses a number of possible hurdles and concludes.
I. MODERN METHODS FOR COUNTING ADVERSE EVENTS
Since the Institute of Medicine published To Err is Human in 2000,
policymakers and researchers have worked to improve patient safety
in hospitals by developing various systems for estimating the incidence
of adverse events throughout the country. These systems vary widely,
not only in how they operate, but also in the adverse event counts
they produce. This Part explores a number of adverse event counting
systems and demonstrates a trend toward accuracy and efficiency in
counting.
A. Hospital Incident Reporting
Incident reporting is the adverse event counting system that hospi-
tals most commonly use.18 CMS requires all participating hospitals to
report adverse events through incident reporting. In 2003, the HHS
promulgated a regulation requiring hospitals to implement programs
to “track medical errors and adverse patient events,” as a condition of
participation in Medicare.19 The Joint Commission and other hospital
accreditors survey hospitals to evaluate compliance with CMS’s ad-
verse event reporting standards.20 Although regulations require hospi-
tals to report adverse events, hospital incident reporting systems are
essentially voluntary because they rely on provider decisions about
18. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 454 (“[Incident reporting]
is still the dominant approach in most hospitals.”).
19. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-09-00091,
HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT HARM 3 (2012)
[hereinafter HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT
HARM].
20. Id.
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whether and when to report an injury as one caused by medical
error.21
Hospital incident reporting systems vary in design and functional-
ity.22 Many hospitals have no clear standards regarding how and when
to document harm.23 In 2009, HHS’s Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) attempted to address these issues by creating
the Common Formats. These guidelines advise providers to report
“patient safety events that reached the patient, whether or not there
was harm involved.”24 The guidelines also provide a list of adverse
events that fall within this definition,25 and provide guidance about
information that reports should include.26
Despite these efforts, hospital incident reporting systems are
thought to be highly inaccurate. While hospital incident reporting sys-
tems estimated that 1% of hospitalizations resulted in an adverse
event, in 2011, Classen et al. found that alternate counting methods
produce substantially higher counts.27 In 2012, the OIG found that
hospital incident reporting captures a small fraction of all adverse
events.28 The OIG used a sample of 293 adverse events taken from a
prior OIG adverse event study.29 They surveyed the hospitals in which
these events occurred to determine which events had been detected
21. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 454 (describing hospital
incident reporting as a voluntary system).
22. For example, Hamilton et al. describe two adverse event reporting systems. In the first,
providers submit electronic forms to report adverse events to a “risk manager.” In the second,
providers anonymously fill out handwritten cards, place them in boxes throughout the hospital,
and each week, a committee reviews these cards. See Emma C. Hamilton et al., Are We Missing
the Near Misses in the OR?—Underreporting of Safety Incidents in Pediatric Surgery, 221 J. SUR-
GICAL RES. 336, 337 (2016); see also Donna O. Farley et al., Adverse-Event-Reporting Practices
by US Hospitals: Results of a National Survey, 17 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 416 (2008).
23. HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT HARM,
supra note 19, at 12.
24. Common Formats, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, https://www.pso
.ahrq.gov/common (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
25. For example, the surgery category lists “[i]ncorrect surgical or invasive procedure” and
“retained surgical item” as adverse events that hospitals should report using the Common For-
mats system. See Common Formats and Event Reporting - Hospital Version 2.0, PSO PRIVACY
PROTECTION CTR., https://www.psoppc.org/psoppc_web/publicpages/commonFormatsHV2.0
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (providing links to lists of adverse events detected using the Common
formats tool).
26. For example, the Common Formats suggests that hospitals focus on three areas: “informa-
tion describing the event, information describing the impact on the patient, and summary and
contributing factor information.” HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE
MOST PATIENT HARM, supra note 19, at 5.
27. See Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 584.
28. HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT HARM,
supra note 19, at 12.
29. Id. at 7.
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by the hospitals’ incident reporting systems.30 They determined that
hospitals reported only 14% of the 293 events.31 Similarly, in 2017,
Khan et al. estimated that hospital incident reporting detected ap-
proximately 10% of adverse events related to the treatment of hospi-
talized children.32 Hospital incident reporting detected only 7 adverse
events out of the 71 the researchers detected.
B. Medicare Algorithms
In addition to developing incident reporting regulations, HHS has
explored other strategies for improving patient safety. In 2001, for ex-
ample, HHS developed the Patient Safety Task Force and charged it
with the goal of improving existing patient safety systems.33 The task
force developed the Medicare Patient Safety Monitoring System (the
MPSMS), designed as “a national surveillance project aimed at identi-
fying the rates of adverse events within the Medicare population.”34
The MPSMS uses algorithms to produce counts. The algorithms are
“discrete, self-contained modules” and do not require clinical exper-
tise or opinion.35 Only events that fall into one of twenty-one event
types are counted.36 For many of the twenty-one event types, includ-
ing blood infections and pressure ulcers, trained abstractors first use
medical chart data to determine if a condition signaling an adverse
event was present on admission and therefore, not an adverse event
that occurred in the hospital.37 These are excluded.38 Next, the ab-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 12.
32. See Alisa Khan et al., Families as Partners in Hospital Error and Adverse Event Surveil-
lance, 171 JAMA: PEDIATRICS 372, 377 (2017).
33. See David C. Classen et al., Measuring Patient Safety: The Medicare Patient Safety Moni-
toring System (Past, Present, and Future), J. PATIENT SAFETY, Oct. 20, 2016, at 2, https://journals
.lww.com/journalpatientsafety/Abstract/publishahead/Measuring_Patient_Safety___The_Medi
care_Patient.99576.aspx [hereinafter Classen et al., Measuring Patient Safety].
34. Id.
35. See David R. Hunt et al., Fundamentals of Medicare Patient Safety Surveillance, in 2
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM RE-
SEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION 105, 114 (James B. Battle et al. eds., 2005).
36. These events include: inpatient falls, pressure ulcers, antibiotic-associated clostridium dif-
ficile, bloodstream infections, catheter-associated urinary tract infections, ventilator-associated
pneumonia, femoral artery punctures, contrast nephropathy, mechanical complications associ-
ated with central lines, postoperative cardiac events (cardiac surgical cases), postoperative car-
diac events (non-cardiac surgical cases), events associated with hypoglycemic agents, events
associated with low molecular weight Heparin, events associated with Warfarin, events associ-
ated with IV Heparin, postoperative pneumonia, postoperative venous thromboembolic events,
events associated with Digoxin, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus, and vancomycin-re-
sistant enterococcus. Yun Wang et al., National Trends in Patient Safety for Four Common Con-
ditions, 2005–2011, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341 app. at 7–28 (2014).
37. Id.
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stractors work through a flow chart of questions based on clinical di-
agnoses and test results from patient chart data to determine which
remaining patients experienced adverse events.39 Unlike hospital inci-
dent reporting, the MPSMS is considered an “involuntary” adverse
event counting system because it reviews data retrospectively and
does not rely on provider reports. This is thought to increase count
accuracy.
The AHRQ is currently upgrading the MPSMS. The upgrade will
build on the successes of the MPSMS but will incorporate the Com-
mon Formats to capture a wider range of harms than the list of
twenty-one adverse event types that the system was initially designed
to count.40 The AHRQ is currently testing ways to automate the
system.41
The MPSMS detects more adverse events than hospital incident re-
porting. MPSMS’s most recent adverse event count, based on a sam-
ple of roughly 33 million discharges from 2014, estimates that 12% of
hospitalizations result in an adverse event.42 In comparison, recall that
Classen et al. found that hospital incident reporting estimates that 1%
of hospitalizations result in adverse events.43 The system’s accuracy,
however, has not been independently evaluated. Some have called it
into question.44
C. Non-Governmental Researcher Methods
Non-governmental researchers have developed their own adverse
event counting methods. The Harvard Medical Practice Study reports
one of the first counts by academic researchers.45 The study’s primary
purpose was to estimate the percentage of adverse events that re-
sulted in medical malpractice claims.46 This required estimating the
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. For example, “[m]ajor additions include additional adverse drug events[,] . . . surgical site
infections[,] and . . . obstetric and neonatal adverse events.” See Classen et al., Measuring Patient
Safety, supra note 33, at 6.
41. Id.
42. Saving Lives and Saving Money: Hospital-Acquired Conditions Update, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY 9 (Dec. 2016), https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/
wysiwyg/professionals/quality-patient-safety/pfp/2014finalhacreport-cx.pdf.
43. See Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 584.
44. See Richard Kronick et al., Improving Safety for Hospitalized Patients: Much Progress but
Many Challenges Remain, 316 JAMA 489, 489 (2016) (noting that AHRQ’s estimates have not
been subjected to peer review).
45. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 245
(1991).
46. The study defined “adverse event” as harm caused by negligent medical care. Id.
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number of negligently-caused adverse events that occurred during the
period under study among a sample of patients randomly drawn from
fifty-one hospitals across the state of New York. The researchers em-
ployed a highly labor-intensive data collection method. Specially
trained nurses, medical record administrators, and licensed physicians
performed detailed, manual reviews of patient medical charts to iden-
tify negligently-caused adverse events.
More recent efforts have focused on reducing the labor required to
count. In 2003, for example, the Institute for Healthcare Improve-
ment, a non-profit research group, developed the Global Trigger Tool
(GTT), a guided chart review counting system based on Classen et
al.’s automated adverse drug event detection system.47 Like the
MPSMS, the GTT is an involuntary system and does not rely on pro-
vider reports.48 The system utilizes the expertise of trained nurses,
who review information in closed patient charts, including “discharge
codes, discharge summaries, medications, lab results, operation
records, nursing notes, physician progress notes, and other notes or
comments.”49 The information is used to identify “triggers,” which are
indications that an adverse event may have occurred.50 If a chart con-
tains a trigger, the reviewers flag it for additional review.51 During the
second stage, reviewers search the patients’ records for evidence of
unintended harm to determine if an adverse event occurred.52 A phy-
sician must sign off on all identified adverse events.53
Some adverse events are easy to identify based solely on diagnoses.
For example, diagnosed pressure ulcers, preventable injuries that re-
sult from prolonged pressure on the skin, are counted as adverse
events if not present upon admission. Other adverse events require
looking beyond an initial diagnosis. In some cases, a diagnosis might
be followed by a surgical procedure that necessitates follow-up treat-
ment to address avoidable complications. A hip osteoarthritis diagno-
47. Lee Alder et al., Global Trigger Tool: Implementation Basics, 4 J. PATIENT SAFETY 245,
245 (2008).
48. See Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 582.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Frances A. Griffin & David C. Classen, Detection of Adverse Events in Surgical Patients
using the Trigger Tool Approach, 17 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 253, 253–54 (2008)
(“For example, transfusion of blood products is a positive trigger. If blood loss during or follow-
ing an operative procedure was within expected limits, then this trigger has not resulted in iden-
tification of an adverse event; in contrast, the documentation of extensive intraoperative or
postoperative bleeding or an unexpected number of transfusions means that an adverse event
has occurred.”).
53. See Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 582.
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sis, for example, might lead to a total hip arthroplasty (or hip
replacement).54 If the patient’s medical records indicate a later diag-
nosis of stiffness or deep periprosthetic joint infection, the records will
be flagged for further review.
Unlike the MPSMS, GTT counts are not limited to the closed list of
twenty-one adverse event types. The GTT is designed to detect any
harm that constitutes an “unintended physical injury resulting from or
contributed to by medical care that requires additional monitoring,
treatment, or hospitalization, or that results in death.”55
The GTT is thought to be less labor intensive than the methods
used in the Harvard Study, and researchers are working to improve
efficiency by automating the counting process. The recently developed
Risk Trigger Monitoring (RTM) system has been designed to detect
adverse events in real time by compiling data extracted from elec-
tronic medical records.56 Like the GTT, the RTM system uses triggers
to flag charts.57 Sammer et al. automated the chart review process,
eliminating the need for manual evaluation.58 RTM continues to re-
quire manual review of chart data to determine which triggers indicate
hospital-caused adverse events.59
In 2011, using the GTT, Classen et al. estimated that 33% of hospi-
tal admissions resulted in a serious adverse event.60 From the study’s
sample of 795 patient charts from three hospitals, the GTT detected
354 adverse events.61 This rate is substantially higher than the counts
produced by either hospital incident reporting (1%) or the MPSMS
(12%).
D. What Explains the Variation?
Several factors account for the variations in estimates, including
data collection methods, pay-for-performance incentives, populations
54. See e.g., Hans Rutberg et al., Adverse Events in Orthopedic Care Identified Via the Global
Trigger Tool in Sweden – Implications on Preventable Prolonged Hospitalizations, 10 PATIENT
SAFETY SURGERY 23 (2016).
55. FRANCES A. GRIFFIN & ROGER K. RESAR, IHI GLOBAL TRIGGER TOOL FOR MEASURING
ADVERSE EVENTS 5 (2d ed. 2009), http://www.ihi.org/resources/Pages/IHIWhitePapers/IHIGlo
balTriggerToolWhitePaper.aspx.
56. Christine Sammer et al., Developing and Evaluating an Automated All-Cause Harm Trig-
ger System, 43 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 155, 156 (2017).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 157–58.
60. See Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 584.
61. Id. at 583–84 (noting that the three hospitals were all tertiary care hospitals, part of large
health systems, and “had developed extensive patient safety programs.”).
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from which samples are drawn, and varying definitions of “adverse
event.”
1. Data Collection Methods
Hospital incident report estimates are lower than MPSMS and GTT
estimates because incident reporting systems are voluntary, while the
MPSMS and the GTT are involuntary.62 Although hospitals partici-
pating in Medicare are required to report adverse events through inci-
dent reporting,63 these systems rely on individual providers to report
the occurrence of patient harm. Several forces drive provider underre-
porting. Examples include fear of medical malpractice claims and neg-
ative reputation effects,64 staff misunderstandings about conditions
that trigger reporting requirements,65 the high cost of investigating
and reporting,66 and weak sanctions for failure to report.67
2. Pay-for-Performance Incentives
Pay-for-performance incentives tied to adverse event detection en-
courage providers to underreport adverse events to optimize patient
safety metrics.68 This sort of manipulation can impact all three types
of counts but has the most severe impact on hospital incident report-
ing and MPSMS counts. Counting methods like the GTT and RTM do
not rely on self-reporting and focus on a broader set of adverse events.
This makes them more likely to capture events that evade detection
by other methods.
Perhaps more concerning, in addition to underreporting adverse
events, providers might manipulate the way they practice medicine to
62. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 454; supra text accompa-
nying note 21.
63. See id.
64. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 455–56 (observing that
communication and resolution programs are designed in part to encourage reporting of adverse
events); see also Emily R. Carrier et al., High Physician Concern About Malpractice Risk
Predicts More Aggressive Diagnostic Testing in Office-Based Practice, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1383,
1389 (2013) (observing that no evidence of changes in reporting practices prompted by these
programs exists).
65. HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS DO NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT HARM,
supra note 19, at 2.
66. See generally Bonnie B. Blanchfield et al., The Hidden Cost of Regulation: The Adminis-
trative Cost of Reporting Serious Reportable Events, 44 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY &
PATIENT SAFETY 212 (2018).
67. See Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury, supra note 8, at 452–53.
68. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-15-
00320, CMS VALIDATED HOSPITAL INPATIENT QUALITY REPORTING PROGRAM DATA, BUT
SHOULD USE ADDITIONAL TOOLS TO IDENTIFY GAMING 1 (2017) [hereinafter CMS VALIDATED
HOSPITAL INPATIENT QUALITY REPORTING PROGRAM DATA].
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avoid detection. Examples include both “overculturing” and “un-
derculturing.”69 Overculturing involves performing unnecessary diag-
nostic tests to render false positives.70 A false positive allows a
provider to bill for a condition that was contracted in the hospital but
falsely diagnosed as present upon admission. Underculturing is the
practice of not conducting necessary diagnostic tests throughout hos-
pital stays in order to avoid acknowledging adverse events in billing
codes.71 In some cases, hospital administrators override physician de-
cisions to report adverse events in an effort to avoid financial penal-
ties or detection.72 Methods that are unable to detect this sort of
manipulation will result in lower counts.
3. Populations
The MPSMS and GTT use data from different populations that face
different health risks. The MPSMS uses data derived from the treat-
ment only of Medicare patients.73 The GTT, on the other hand, is not
limited to these populations. It is, however, severely limited in other
ways. Classen et al. drew their sample from the set of “all adults” who
received care at three high-quality tertiary care hospitals.74 Drawing
general inferences from data based only on the Medicare population
is impossible. Similarly, drawing general inferences from GTT counts
is impossible given the high levels of variation across hospitals in qual-
ity, types of patients, and types of care provided.
4. “Adverse Event” Definitions
All three counting methods define adverse events differently. Not
only do hospitals apply a variety of definitions, producing cross-hospi-
tal variation, but evidence also suggests that staff members of the
same hospital apply varying definitions, which leads to within-hospital
variation.75 Differences in MPSMS and GTT counts likely are at least
partly attributable to the use of varying definitions. In addition, while
the MPSMS detects harms confined to a list of twenty-one adverse
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Classen et al., Measuring Patient Safety, supra note 33, at 2. Medicare patients include
adults over the age of 65, individuals with certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage
renal disease. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (2012).
74. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 583 (“We randomly selected study
patients from all adult (age on admission greater than eighteen years) inpatients . . . .”).
75. See CMS VALIDATED HOSPITAL INPATIENT QUALITY REPORTING PROGRAM DATA, supra
note 68, at 1.
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events, the GTT is not limited to this list.76 The GTT detects any harm
that constitutes an “unintended physical injury resulting from or con-
tributed to by medical care that requires additional monitoring, treat-
ment, or hospitalization, or that results in death.”77 Classen et al.
suggest that such differences in definition at least partially explain
count variation.78 The GTT’s broader definition of adverse events
likely contributes to the system’s higher adverse event estimates.
We turn now to a number of technological advances the law can
capitalize on to improve counts.
II. USING LAW AND TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE COUNTS
Part II highlighted two main objectives in our quest for a better
counting system. First, we need a way to efficiently collect data that
we can use to produce generalizable adverse event count estimates.
Second, we need to find a way around unintended, indirect incentives
for providers and administrators to avoid adverse event detection. In
this Part, we discuss three technological advances policymakers might
consider when designing methods aimed at achieving these objectives.
A. Electronic Medical Records and Digitized Claims Data
The use of electronic medical records systems by hospitals and phy-
sicians is now widespread.79 While electronic medical records (EMRs)
have been around for some time, the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 and the
Affordable Care Act led to an increase in the use of EMRs.80 When
an entity moves to participate in Medicare as an Accountable Care
76. See supra text accompanying note 55.
77. Griffin & Resar, supra note 55, at 5.
78. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’, supra note 5, at 586 (“[O]ur study used a broader
definition of adverse events and did not require that these events either be judged preventable
or lead to major disability, as in prior studies.”); see also J. Matthew Austin & Peter J. Pronovost,
“Never Events” and the Quest to Reduce Preventable Harm, 41 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUAL-
ITY & PATIENT SAFETY 279, 282 (2015).
79. Spencer S. Jones et al., Health Information Technology: An Updated Systematic Review
with a Focus on Meaningful Use, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 48 (2014); Joseph Conn, Hospitals
Achieve 96% EHR Adoption Rate; Data Exchange Still Needs Work, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(May 31, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160531/NEWS/160539990;
Mathematica Policy Research et al., Health Information Technology in the United States: Better
Information Systems for Better Care (July 8, 2013), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/re
ports/reports/2013/rwjf406758.
80. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 230 (2009); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702,
124 Stat. 119, 318–19 (2010).
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Organization, it is required to coordinate care through EMRs.81 HHS
gives grants to providers to adopt, implement, upgrade, and demon-
strate meaningful use of EMRs.82 While hospitals clearly have not op-
timized meaningful use, the percentage of practitioners that use them
continues to grow.83
Hospitals have also made great strides towards digitizing informa-
tion used to obtain reimbursements from payers (i.e., claims data).
Payers, such as private insurers and CMS, require disclosure of a vast
amount of information required to verify that goods and services they
have promised to cover and billed for have, in fact, been provided to
the payers’ enrollees. These data include diagnoses; procedures per-
formed; number and type of prescriptions dispensed; patient
demographics; and service, admission, and discharge dates.84 Some
states have adopted the use of all-payer claims databases to aggregate
claims data that can be used to answer policy and research questions
related to cost, quality, and access to medical care.85
The move toward digitized information allows for less labor-inten-
sive methods to count adverse events.86
B. Computer Algorithms and Machine Learning
The second important advancement is the use of computer algo-
rithms and machine learning. Computer algorithms allow for automa-
tion of otherwise labor-intensive processes.87 Computers have the
81. Taylor Burke, Law and the Public’s Health: Accountable Care Organizations, 126 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 875, 875–78 (2011).
82. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Awards $125 Million to Support Community
Health Center Quality Improvement (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/08/15/
hhs-awards-125-million-support-community-health-center-quality-improvement.html.
83. Eric J. Lammers & Catherine G. McLaughlin, Meaningful Use of Electronic Health
Records and Medicare Expenditures: Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis of U.S. Health Care
Markets, 2010–2013, 52 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1364, 1378–81 (2017). While the use of electronic
medical records is on the rise, the quality of the information in the records and the use of them
have been scrutinized. Id.; see also Julia Adler-Milstein, Achieving the Right Balance: Safer Care
Through HIT and Avoiding Safety Failures from HIT, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 197 (2019); Ross
Koppel, Uses of the Legal System that Attenuate Patient Safety, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 273 (2019).
84. Inventory and Prioritization of Measures to Support the Growing Effort in Transparency
Using All-Payer Claims Databases: Data Evaluation of All-Payer Claims Databases, AGENCY
FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-
safety/quality-resources/apcd/backgroundrpt/data.html (last visited Apr. 2017).
85. Patrick B. Miller et al., All-Payer Claims Databases: An Overview for Policymakers, ALL-
PAYERS CLAIM DATABASE COUNCIL (May 2010), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/SCI_All_
Payer_Claims_ReportREV.pdf.
86. See Mindy K. Ross et al., “Big Data” and the Electronic Health Record, 9 INT’L MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N YEARBOOK MED. INFORMATICS 97, 99 (2014).
87. For an application in medicine, see William E. Trick et al., Computer Algorithms to Detect
Bloodstream Infections, 10 EMERGENCY INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1612, 1619 (2004).
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capacity to perform sets of procedures many times faster than
humans. Machine learning involves the use of computers to automate
discovery of useful patterns in data.88 These technologies are being
put to widespread use in medicine, including in biomedical research,89
genomic medicine,90 and cancer diagnosis and detection.91
During the last few decades, computer technology has been used to
design advanced adverse event detection methods.92 The Risk Trigger
Monitoring System described supra is an example of a patient safety
tool that has capitalized on both digitization of medical records and
computer algorithms. Other researchers are moving towards the use
of machine learning-based systems to predict the presence of adverse
events caused by the treatment of cardiac conditions.93 Machine learn-
ing has been employed to identify and collect adverse drug events to
improve drug safety.94 Researchers are currently experimenting with
IBM’s Watson to design a method to detect adverse events stemming
from misuse of pharmaceuticals.95 As described by Chen et al.,
[T]he current capability of Watson to read and extract relationships
from text is being applied to pilot research projects in
pharmacovigilance. A few research projects with large pharmaceuti-
cal companies have involved the application of Watson to reading
both published journal articles and adverse event case reports to
evaluate whether Watson can assist the drug safety process through
faster recognition and coding of adverse events out of text. In this
case, Watson may be used to augment existing drug safety personnel
88. SHAI SHALEV-SHWARTZ & SHAI BEN-DAVID, UNDERSTANDING MACHINE LEARNING:
FROM THEORY TO ALGORITHMS 22 (2014).
89. Andreas Holzinger & Igor Jurisica, Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining in Biomedical
Informatics: The Future Is in Integrative, Interactive Machine Learning Solutions, in INTERACTIVE
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING IN BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS: STATE-OF-THE-
ART AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 1–18 (2014).
90. Michael K. K. Leung et al., Machine Learning in Genomic Medicine: A Review of Compu-
tational Problems and Data Sets, 104 PROC. IEEE 176 (2016).
91. Joseph A. Cruz & David S. Wishart, Applications of Machine Learning in Cancer Predic-
tion and Prognosis, 2 CANCER INFORMATICS 59, 69 (2006).
92. David W. Bates et al., Detecting Adverse Events Using Information Technology, 10 J. AM.
MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 115, 116 (2003); Barry R. Furrow, Searching for Adverse Events: Big
Data and Beyond, 27 ANNALS HEALTH L. 149, 150 (2018) (discussing the use of modern data
analysis and adverse event detection tools in liability claims).
93. Evanthia E. Tripoliti et al., Heart Failure: Diagnosis, Severity Estimation and Prediction of
Adverse Events Through Machine Learning Techniques, 15 COMPUTATIONAL & STRUCTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 26, 35 (2017).
94. Harsha Gurulingappa et al., Extraction of Potential Adverse Drug Events from Medical
Case Reports, 3 J. BIOMEDICAL SEMANTICS 15 (2012).
95. Ying Chen et al., IBM Watson: How Cognitive Computing Can Be Applied to Big Data
Challenges in Life Sciences Research, 38 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 688, 696 (2016).
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to speed their work and support timely reporting of adverse events
to U.S. and European regulatory agencies.96
While researchers have come a long way in the use of technology to
detect adverse events, their results are not especially useful for regula-
tors tasked with generating comprehensive counts. The most obvious
problem is the lack of generalizability. Researcher results cannot be
used to estimate the total number of adverse events, even within a
subspecialty of medicine or within a geographic region. Research
studies generally collect data from a small number of providers, often-
times just one, and from narrow geographic areas. Given variation in
patient populations, treatment methods, and levels of medical care
provided by hospitals from which samples are drawn, attempting to
generalize from the results of research studies is futile.
Although regulators are unable to generalize from the results of
published studies, they are able to put to use the methods that re-
searchers employ to detect and count adverse events. Despite re-
searcher adoption of recent technological advances, however,
regulators generally continue to use hospital incident reporting sys-
tems that rely on voluntary disclosure to produce comprehensive ad-
verse event counts.97 These counts are highly unreliable given the
system’s voluntary nature. Hospitals might be reluctant to report all
adverse events out of fear of facing medical malpractice claims or hits
to their reputations. Weak sanctions for underreporting make matters
worse. Misunderstandings about reporting requirements might at least
partially explain the low counts.
To avoid these issues, regulators should move away from relying on
regulated entities’ self-reports. Ideally, external counters should be
given access to all necessary data to detect and count adverse events
and make use of technological advances to efficiently wade through
the undoubtedly vast amounts of information. This is not all that is
required, however. HHS’s experience with provider reactions to their
counting methods—specifically, provider changes in diagnosis and
treatment methods designed to artificially reduce adverse event
counts—illuminates the need to address predictable data manipula-
tion behaviors.
The following Section introduces a third technological advance and
argues that it can be used to weaken incentives to underreport and to
otherwise game the system while, at the same time, change patient
96. Id.
97. A counterexample is Medicare’s use of technology to detect never events. These counts,
however, cannot confidently be used to generalize to non-Medicare and Medicaid populations.
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safety regulatory culture from one emphasizing negative reinforce-
ment to one focused instead on collaboration.
C. Cryptography
Most recently, policymakers have started to take advantage of tech-
nological advancements in cryptography to collect sensitive data in
ways that protect the anonymity of entities that submit the data.98 Re-
sults are produced using data sent over the web by entities that are
allowed to remain anonymous. The technology not only protects sub-
mitter identities but can also ensure that the data never leave the sub-
mitters’ computer servers. Extractors receive only aggregated
information that is untraceable to any submitter. Web-based secure
multi-party computation allows information from multiple submitters
to be combined to produce results while ensuring that none of the
information can be tracked back to any particular submitter.
Regulators are already making use of this technology in other are-
nas. In 2014, then-Mayor Thomas Menino created the Boston
Women’s Workforce Council. By 2016, the Council had secured more
than 50 employers as signatories to the 100% Talent: The Boston
Women’s Compact (Compact).99 As part of the agreement, the com-
panies’ CEOs promised to provide wage data that would be used to
produce a report on the wage gap. Inside legal counsel and human
resources personnel, however, advised against it due to concerns over
revealing payroll data. Working with researchers, the Council pro-
posed the use of secure multi-party computation to gather the data.
Following a pilot run, in 2016, the Council was able to convince 69
Boston employers employing over 112,000 workers to sign on to the
Compact and to make their data available for aggregation by the com-
putation program.100 Unsurprisingly, the invisible data revealed a gen-
der gap. Covering 114 employers and nearly 167,000 workers, the 2017
report revealed not only a gender wage gap but also a race wage
gap.101 While it is impossible to verify the gap estimates, these early
efforts have helped to shine light on the issue and to get employer
98. Andrei Lapets et al., Web-based Multi-party Computation with Application to Anony-
mous Aggregate Compensation Analytics (Aug. 15, 2015) (Technical Report BUCS-TR-2015-
010), https://www.cs.bu.edu/techreports/pdf/2015-009-mpc-compensation.pdf.
99. Andrew Thurston, Calculating Gender Pay Equity in Boston, MEDIUM (July 12, 2016),
https://medium.com/boston-university-pr/calculating-gender-pay-equity-in-boston-dcc00607e0d1.
100. Boston Women’s Workforce Council Report 2016, BOSTON.GOV, https://www.boston.gov/
sites/default/files/bwwc_report_final_january_4_2017.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
101. Boston Women’s Workforce Council Report 2017, BOSTON.GOV, https://www.boston.gov/
sites/default/files/document-file-01-2018/bwwc_2017_report.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
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leadership into the same room to collaborate about ways to make pro-
gress towards eliminating the gaps.
This technology might prove useful in moving us towards the collec-
tion of more accurate data on adverse events arising from medical
care. We know of no instances of regulators using anonymous data
collection techniques to collect adverse event data.102 Researchers,
however, have started to do so.103 White et al. accepted anonymously
reported adverse events data when studying injuries caused by acu-
puncture.104 Suresh et al. took steps they claimed ensured anonymity
by collecting data related to medical errors made giving neonatal in-
tensive medical care using an Internet-based system.105 They did not
collect information about the reporting individual, and they ensured
that “no record of the IP address of the submitting computer was
stored at the central reporting site.”106 Seiden and Barach developed
an anonymous Internet-based reporting site to collect data on injuries
caused by “[w]rong-side/wrong-site, wrong-procedure, and wrong-pa-
tient errors. . . .”107
102. Some have argued the benefits of allowing health care providers to report adverse events
anonymously. See, e.g., Bill Runciman et al., Improving Patients’ Safety by Gathering Informa-
tion, 323 BRIT. J. MED. 298, 298 (2001). The U.S. Veterans Health Administration explored but
finally abandoned an anonymous adverse event data collection that was modeled after a system
designed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. See William B. Weeks & James
P. Bagian, Developing a Culture of Safety in the Veterans Health Administration, 6 EFFECTIVE
CLINICAL PRAC. 270, 273–74 (2000); Debbie Chase & Douglas McCarthy, Case Study: Sustaining
a Culture of Safety in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care System, COMMON-
WEALTH FUND, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/case-study-
sustaining-culture-safety-us-department-veterans-affairs (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). Government
agencies have funded research projects that study anonymous reporting systems. See Wilson D.
Pace et al., Database Design to Ensure Anonymous Study of Medical Errors: A Report from the
ASIPS Collaborative, 10 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 531, 531 (2003). In 2005, Congress
passed the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21 et seq., to provide
“legal protections around reporting and analysis of patient safety events when reported” which
ensures confidentiality but not anonymity. Peter L. Elkin et al., Improving Patient Safety Report-
ing with the Common Formats: Common Data Representation for Patient Safety Organizations,
64 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 116, 117 (2016).
103. Private actors have also made use of this approach. See e.g., Paul Conlon et al., Using an
Anonymous Web-Based Incident Reporting Tool to Embed the Principles of a High-Reliability
Organization, in 1 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, ADVANCES IN PATIENT
SAFETY: NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 1, 5 (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds.,
2008).
104. Adrian White et al., Adverse Events Following Acupuncture: Prospective Survey of 32 000
Consultations with Doctors and Physiotherapists, 323 BRIT. J. MED. 485 (2001).
105. Gautham Suresh et al., Voluntary Anonymous Reporting of Medical Errors for Neonatal
Intensive Care, 113 PEDIATRICS 1609 (2004).
106. Id. at 1610.
107. Samuel C. Seiden & Paul Barach, Wrong-Side/Wrong-Site, Wrong-Procedure, and
Wrong-Patient Adverse Events, 141 ARCHIVES SURGERY 931, 934 (2006).
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Regulator use of anonymous data collection techniques could gen-
erate a number of positive side effects. For example, anonymity might
encourage collaborative approaches to reducing the number of ad-
verse events that occur in hospitals.108 More importantly, though, the
promise of anonymity might reduce potentially harmful forms of data
manipulation. Providers generally assume that adverse events reflect
poorly on them and could potentially harm their reputations and pos-
sibly hurt their bottom lines. When data can be traced back to the
source, providers have incentives to choose to withhold information to
avoid detection of adverse events.
In addition, and perhaps more troubling, evidence suggests hospi-
tals employ a number of tactics to avoid adverse event detection. As
discussed supra, both overculturing and underculturing expose pa-
tients to potential harm and increase the cost of care. To the extent
unnecessary diagnostic tests increase the risk of harm to patients,
overculturing increases the number of injuries. Underculturing is also
potentially harmful. For example, when hospitals avoid diagnostics to
get around reporting requirements related to hospital-acquired infec-
tions, doctors treat conditions in the absence of important informa-
tion. Consequently, doctors prescribe broad-spectrum antibiotics,
which might lead to negative social outcomes such as antibiotic
resistance.109
Providers might react to mandated information disclosure in other
sorts of perverse ways. Some argue that adverse event reporting re-
quirements compel providers to cherry-pick patients. Rubin, for ex-
ample, suggests that evaluating physician quality based on patient
outcomes generates incentives to turn away patients based on socio-
economic status or health issue complexity.110 This sort of reaction to
reporting requirements might put the most vulnerable patients at risk.
Others point to “upcoding” as a possible response. Bastani et al.
employ a clever identification strategy to measure the prevalence of
upcoding in Medicare claims reporting.111 They define “upcoding” as
“the practice of biasing claims reports towards higher-paying diagno-
108. Harrington, supra note 17, 376–77 (suggesting that more collaborative methods might
increase the efficacy of patient safety initiatives).
109. See CMS VALIDATED HOSPITAL INPATIENT QUALITY REPORTING PROGRAM DATA,
supra note 68, at 6.
110. Rita Rubin, How Value-Based Medicare Payments Exacerbate Health Care Disparities,
319 JAMA 968, 969 (2018).
111. Hamsa Bastani et al., Evidence of Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs 1–4 (July
13, 2015) (Research Paper) (on file with Stanford University Graduate School of Business),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/evidence-upcoding-pay-performance-
programs.
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ses, rather than taking steps to reduce the true rate of [hospital ac-
quired conditions],” a category of adverse events defined by
Medicare. Bastani et al. find evidence that, in Medicare billing data,
physicians classify infections acquired in the hospital as present-upon-
admission to avoid taking a hit on reimbursement from Medicare for
medical care necessary to treat an adverse event.
Some have reported evidence of early discharge of hospital patients
to avoid financial penalties triggered by adverse events. For example,
Andrew Ryan discusses provider decisions to discharge patients as
soon as possible after admission to avoid getting penalized for an ad-
verse event, such as a hospital-borne infection.112 Research suggests
that hospitals discharged a large number of patients too early, only to
readmit them shortly after. Readmission triggers another Medicare re-
imbursement, a profitable outcome for the hospital. When Medicare
discovered that its penalty structure resulted in increased costs, it in-
stituted a penalty for readmissions within thirty days of discharge.113
While it might be possible to develop ways to detect manipulation,
any detection method will be costly and likely not foolproof given the
methods providers use to avoid detection. Anonymous data collection
along with a collaborative approach to error reduction might soften or
even eliminate incentives to manipulate the data.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We argue that regulators should consider taking advantage of three
recent technological advances to improve health care quality: (1) the
shift of the industry towards implementing electronic medical records
and claims data, (2) the use of algorithms and machine learning, and
(3) the use of cryptography to protect the identities of entities that
disclose sensitive information. Although electronic data and machine-
driven automation currently are making it easier to collect informa-
tion about adverse events, non-anonymous data collection techniques
have been found to encourage providers to manipulate the data and,
more importantly, to provide substandard medical treatment. The ad-
dition of cryptography to ensure anonymity might lead to more accu-
rate counts and overall better information about medical errors.
Better information, coupled with a more cooperative approach to so-
lutions, holds promise as an avenue to improved patient safety.
112. Andrew M. Ryan, Improving Patient Safety Through Policy: Is Payment Reform Up to
the Task?, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 333 (2019).
113. Julia James, Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH AFF. (Nov.
12, 2013), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20131112.646839/full/.
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Our proposal is not free from potential hurdles. Three hurdles are
worth mentioning. First, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that
the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) limits
the ability of state regulators to require self-insured insurance plans to
disclose claims data—presumably anonymously or otherwise.114 Prior
to the Court’s decision, sixteen states required all payors, including
private insurers, to report claims data for purposes of gathering infor-
mation on medical care utilization and spending. These states can no
longer require self-insured employer plans to disclose their claims
data. These self-insured employer plans constitute over 60% of pri-
vate health insurance plans.115 To the extent that collecting claims
data from insurers as opposed to providers is optimal, Gobeille erects
a hurdle for states hoping to gather a complete set of information
from insurers. Two developments, however, suggest the hurdle might
not be a major cause for concern. First, the Court’s ruling cannot pre-
vent the U.S. Department of Labor from mandating information dis-
closure, and there has been some movement in this direction.116
Second, some insurers continue to disclose data even though states
can no longer require them to do so.117 It’s quite possible that volun-
tary participation might spur more cooperative problem-solving by in-
dustry actors.
A second potential hurdle is the questionable usefulness of anony-
mously gathered data. While anonymity might dampen the reluctance
to hand over data, regulators will not be able to determine which
providers have the highest incidence of medical errors, experience in-
creases in medical error rates, and cause the most serious types of
harm to patients. This makes it impossible to target regulations de-
signed to decrease errors to specific providers. Despite this, the collec-
tion of anonymous data will generate more efficient targeting of
resources by allowing the tracking of aggregate time trends, the study
of effects of state or regional interventions, the development of proto-
cols to reduce medical error rates, and the analysis of costs and bene-
fits. In addition, to the extent that anonymity helps to move the
industry towards a more cooperative stance, tying errors back to par-
ticular providers is unnecessary. Relative to current data collection
114. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 946 (2016).
115. Gregory D. Curfman, All-Payer Claims Databases After Gobeille, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170303.058995/full/; see also Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, ERISA Preemption After Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: Completing the Re-
trenchment of Shaw, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301 (2017).
116. Curfman, supra note 115.
117. Id.
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methods, which have yet to prove successful in decreasing medical er-
ror rates, anonymous data collection has some promise.
A third hurdle is the possibility that data manipulation might con-
tinue despite anonymity. To the extent that reporters do not trust the
promise of anonymity or continue to be driven by incentives to get
regulators off their backs, promised anonymity might not succeed in
wringing data manipulation out of the system. This, of course, is most
problematic when the methods of manipulation put patients at risk.
Regulators, however, can take additional steps to dampen incentives
to manipulate. First, they can use the data in ways that encourage de-
sirable behavior. Formulating regulations to function as carrots in-
stead of sticks might be one way to achieve this. Second, regulators
can take steps to facilitate cooperation by industry actors in the search
for solutions. The city of Boston’s success in facilitating cooperative
efforts to reduce the gender wage gap provides a useful model.118
The time seems right for a paradigm shift in the regulation of medi-
cal errors. Traditional methods grounded in mandatory information
disclosure have failed to deliver. Technological advances hold promise
for moving us in a new direction.
118. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
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